The Taliban do not live on fundamentalism alone: among oppression, corruption, and a flood of money

It is well known: the Taliban government is sustained by aid from donor countries, particularly the United States, sent to Afghanistan.

Reports from the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (Sigar) have shown this multiple times. Most of the aid arriving in the country is intercepted by the Taliban in various ways and retained, either peacefully or through coercion, for the direct support of the state apparatus and to foster loyalty and support among the officials who administer, maintain, and uphold the regime at various levels, especially in the most remote regions. The organizations responsible for distributing the aid lack either the capacity or the will to monitor or reject this diversion.

But how did the Taliban manage to establish this model of governance so quickly? In reality, the apparatus was already in place: the Afghan economy was already accustomed to surviving on external funding and corruption. During twenty years of U.S. dominance, the Islamic Republic had not developed an independent and self-sufficient economy because the U.S. policy had been to use “money as a weapon,” meaning flooding Afghanistan with enormous amounts of money to “keep terrorists and potential rebellions in check” without having to intervene directly with troops and weapons.

U.S. money and economic contracts enriched and empowered warlords and militia commanders, including the Taliban—some estimates suggest they received 10% of the funds—to discourage attacks on NATO convoys. U.S. money had thus permeated all levels of Afghan politics and society, perpetuating an environment conducive to embezzlement, fraud, and favoritism. Every government official, from the president to the low-ranking functionaries, took advantage of this to enrich themselves, and the entire system was sustained by corruption and bribes.

When the United States and the coalition left the country, everyone who had sustained themselves and grown rich through this system of corruption either fled Afghanistan or went into hiding, but nothing changed: only the beneficiaries shifted, replaced by the Taliban, their militants, and their supporters, who inserted themselves wherever they could to seize sources of income and wealth.

Thus, the taxes, bribes, and levies systematically and in large quantities demanded not only from wealthy NGOs and international institutions providing aid but also from the poorest strata of the hungry population and even the poorest women—those without husbands and jobs—enrich not so much the state coffers but the personal wealth of Taliban ministers and their affiliates, turning Afghanistan into a full-fledged kleptocratic state.

How do the Taliban generate their wealth? Primarily through taxes, “a tax system so rigorous and efficient that it has received praise from international agencies, but which is in reality a system of extortion carried out under their authority to consolidate their power, support the repressive machine, build madrasas and mosques, and promote the Talibanization of society, without providing any services to the population. It’s effectively an extortion system aimed at one of the most unfortunate populations on the planet,” explains Zan Times.

They also collect income through the issuance of various licenses and services for which they can charge official fees and unofficial bribes, such as for passports and ID cards. In 2022, between $800 and $3,000 was charged for a passport, bringing in a total of about $50 million in issuance fees. The cost of ID cards reached $5, a significant amount for more than half of Afghan citizens who live on less than $1.90 a day, and so far, the Taliban have issued around four million of them.

Taxes are also collected informally, through door-to-door visits, with imprisonment, threats, and acts of violence for non-payment of customs and tax duties, as well as new exorbitant taxes imposed on the private sector, which are unaffordable even for entrepreneurs.

And then there are the bribes demanded from women and their families. Thanks to laws restricting women’s freedoms, those in power can profit from the permits issued on a case-by-case basis. Restrictions on women traveling alone or abroad, the requirement to wear the hijab, and the ban on working have become sources of income for those in power, no matter how small. Many women have testified that they were only able to cross borders or travel by paying bribes or fines.

It becomes clear that the restrictions imposed on the population, particularly on women, are not only driven by the fundamentalist zeal of Taliban religious leaders who want to spread sharia but also by the economic opportunities these restrictions offer to officials who apply them, in the form of bribes and taxes for any essential service required for survival.

The absolute subjugation women are forced into, which makes them work in conditions akin to slavery and renders them the poorest stratum of society—humanitarian aid reaches women and children last or not at all—allows the Taliban to profit by exploiting their labor.

Where taxes are insufficient, corruption takes over. Witnesses have told 8AM Media that corruption has increased significantly compared to the first emirate. “Officials are involved in business ventures, buying land and houses, building oil reservoirs, and conducting trade. Additionally, there are cases of drug trafficking, and most local commanders, once in power, take a second, third, and fourth wife, organize lavish weddings, and buy expensive cars. The same officials admit that corruption, particularly rampant in customs, is uncontrollable because every commander or Taliban member has ties to the regime and is untouchable.”

In the Taliban power structure, where wives are seen as status symbols, leaders, officials, and fighters are fueling the practice of offering “bride prices” higher than the market rate, exploiting both the desire to curry favor with the Taliban through blood ties and the fear of reprisals in the event of refusal.

Government employment is also a means of rewarding fighters and loyalists while punishing dissenters. It has therefore been an immediate focus of Taliban attention to ensure control through various absurd decrees, such as replacing female public servants at the Ministry of Finance with male family members, regardless of their qualifications, or introducing a religious test, arbitrarily used to fire workers in public hospitals and at all levels of the Ministry of Education.

Unsurprisingly, power positions have been entrusted to relatives: the accusations against Taliban leaders for appointing their sons and other male relatives to government positions have become so serious that Supreme Leader Akhundzada issued a decree in March 2023 ordering officials to stop.

But while the privileges granted to low-ranking officials serve to ensure their unwavering loyalty, the more powerful leaders have more significant sources of income and, above all, are organizing to safeguard their wealth abroad, following well-established paths from the previous government—namely, through travel.

“Health reasons” is the excuse used to circumvent international sanctions that prohibit Taliban government officials—all of whom have been accused of international terrorism for many years—from traveling. In reality, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Pakistan, and Turkey have always been willing to offer individual Taliban leaders a safe haven for their assets or families, allowing them to move personal financial resources abroad.

Though the government publishes budgets, it is reluctant to explain how economic resources are used. There is no public accounting or criteria for awarding government contracts, property sales, licenses, or other concessions, nor are there external accountability mechanisms. According to the president of Afghan Peace Watch, close relatives of at least two current interim Taliban ministers have private offices through which Afghan and foreign contractors can obtain government contracts and other favors for an additional fee.

Rather than concern themselves with international recognition, the Taliban seem more interested in increasing their access to cash, and customs revenues are a significant source of foreign currency, given that the international community has cut off access to foreign reserves.

Exports and customs duties related to natural resources have significantly increased their income. Taliban leaders exert virtually unchecked control over the rights, extraction, and export of Afghanistan’s mineral wealth. Especially coal—relying on child labor—but a United Nations report has indicated they also smuggle precious stones and semi-precious metals to Central Asia, Europe, and the Persian Gulf. Similarly, illegal logging and timber exports have become very profitable.

Smuggling is also a source of wealth. A major route for illicit trade, drug trafficking, and other corrupt practices is the Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA), which sees a vast quantity of products diverted to Pakistan’s black market, circumventing tariffs and duties, estimated at billions of dollars, without any checks being imposed: officials and border agents are either bribed or coerced into not intervening.

The Taliban have also been identified as directly involved in arms trafficking. With their permission, arms dealers have set up bazaars in the Helmand, Kandahar, and Nangarhar regions, with weapons imported from Austria, China, Pakistan, Russia, and Turkey.

Human trafficking by smuggling networks is another source of income: while senior Taliban leaders have publicly declared a ban on it, individual guards do not hesitate to accept bribes in exchange for turning a blind eye at border crossings, according to reports.

Then there is the opium trade, which has always been the main source of wealth for the Taliban. The government has banned its cultivation, causing heroin prices to rise significantly, benefiting the wealthier individuals who can profit from the stockpiled opium. The Taliban leaders banned opium cultivation because they want to impose their authority, deciding where and whether it can be cultivated and who the authorized traffickers are to manage, cultivate, and process narcotics.

Finally, there are humanitarian organizations operating in Afghanistan: they are often forced to pay taxes, presumably to ensure their security. The Taliban even demand 15% of U.N. aid. But that’s not all: they have infiltrated many organizations with their affiliates, occupying strategic positions to manipulate aid and direct funds toward their supporters, family members, disabled soldiers, veterans, and madrasas, sometimes with the mediation of mullahs who serve as community leaders in exchange for a bribe. And those who manage to receive aid are taxed up to 66% of what they get.

They have also established and registered their own NGOs, which they control directly, and through which they can receive humanitarian aid from international organizations and distribute it in areas with greater political, ethnic, regional, and religious affinities.

But how much money have they managed to obtain this way? If we look, for example, at aid sent by the United States, which is by far the largest donor, SIGAR reveals that since August 2021, U.S. implementing partners have paid at least $10.9 million to the Taliban government in taxes, fees, and services. However, SIGAR believes that, since payments made by UN agencies receiving U.S. funds are not subject to scrutiny, the actual amount could be much higher, considering that from October 2021 to September 2023, the United Nations received $1.6 billion from the United States, out of a total of $2.9 billion in U.S. aid over the three-year period. All this money helps keep the Taliban in power because it pays the privileges and corruption of their loyal corrupt officials and supporters, ensuring their backing.

What would happen if this aid stopped flowing?

A significant part of the documentation supporting this article comes from the George W. Bush Presidential Center report ‘Corruption and Kleptocracy in Afghanistan under the Taliban.’

Beatrice Biliato is part of the Italian Coordination in Support of Afghan Women (CISDA)