Can the Taliban Stop Being Fundamentalists?

Can the Taliban stop being fundamentalists? Can they restore freedom and rights to Afghan women and girls?

This is what the UN and the international community hoped for when they organized the second meeting of the 25 richest countries in the world on February 18-19 in Doha to discuss Afghanistan’s issues, as they had done a year ago. However, this time they invited the Taliban directly to participate, aiming to initiate a process of rapprochement and “normalization” that could circumvent the seemingly insurmountable obstacle of recognizing their government.

In essence, it was a realpolitik move, a de facto recognition without making it official, so that public opinion wouldn’t notice—or at least wouldn’t feel guilty.

This strategy began in April 2023 when the UN Special Coordinator for Afghanistan, Feridun Sinirlioğlu, was tasked with conducting an “independent” assessment of the relations between the democratic world and the de facto government of Afghanistan. This assessment focused on the conditions of women and the Afghan population after two years of economic and humanitarian crises following the Taliban’s return to Kabul.

It was verified that economic and political sanctions imposed on Afghanistan to pressure the Taliban and force them to ease their grip on women’s human rights had not shaken their fundamentalist ideology or their political solidity. Despite billions in aid received directly and indirectly from international cooperation and the richest states, the situation for the people had not significantly improved, while the Taliban had continued to consolidate thanks to international aid and good relations with regional states, ignoring the ritual complaints about international law violations. Even the United Nations began discussing a strategy shift.

No longer was the idea to pressure the Taliban directly to conform their government to international norms of democracy, women’s rights, and inclusivity in exchange for recognition. Instead, a rapprochement strategy was devised, engaging in dialogue with the Taliban. It was thought that engagement with the West might persuade them of the benefits of democracy and the drawbacks of their sharia, or at least show them the advantage of becoming more flexible.

From this new conviction arose the idea of inviting the Taliban to the second Doha meeting—despite protests from civil society and women’s democratic organizations, who were silenced with a token invitation to a few of them—but how were they chosen? it was asked—for a side meeting apart from the official ones.

Here comes the twist: the Taliban not only did not show gratitude for this opportunity to finally join the international community of respectable states but outright snubbed the meeting, refusing to participate unless they were the sole representatives of the Afghan people—no women, no other forces—in essence demanding immediate recognition… and without offering anything in return.

Thus, in the controversial issue that has been debated for months between the UN, which defends state interests, and organizations that defend women and human rights—whether it’s more beneficial to democracy to tie recognition of the de facto government to concessions of rights or to engage in dialogue in hopes of gradually convincing them to change—the Taliban themselves resolved the problem by not showing up, uninterested in dialogue unless on their terms.

In the final press conference, Guterres put on a brave face, not showing disappointment at the refusal, applauding the agreement among all present, acknowledging that bilateral or regional meetings work better with the Taliban, and hoping they would be more open in the future. A perfunctory comment that masked the meeting’s failure.

But why didn’t the Taliban accept the West’s extended hand, the chance to finally emerge from isolation?

Firstly, because they are not isolated. They already “dialogue” with the US and the European Union and receive money from Western countries. Increasingly, they make economic deals and agreements with China, Russia, Iran, and regional and Middle Eastern countries, which have already, to varying degrees, recognized them de facto without ideological difficulties despite formal statements.

But most importantly, even if they were genuinely isolated, the Taliban could not open to an inclusive government or negotiate women’s rights because their integralist and fundamentalist ideology does not allow for the exchange of ideas and mediation. They want all or nothing—the complete application of their religious and political vision or complete isolation, awaiting a victorious return.

Therefore, it is illusory to believe that granting recognition and concessions could secure any rights for women. The Taliban’s positions are unshakeable because if they were not misogynistic, uncompromising, and fundamentalist, they would not be the Taliban.

They can make economic agreements with anyone and accept conditions, but what distinguishes and characterizes them is their intransigence in personal life and ideology, the absolute enslavement of body and mind to those “Muslim” religious principles they consider the only possible truth. If they became inclusive and democratic, they would lose their identity and reason for being.

Hostility towards women’s freedoms and rights is part of the identity of fundamentalist groups, which cannot give it up without losing their identity. This is why it is not feasible to negotiate with the Taliban; they must simply be defeated, and their ideology eradicated.

Religious fanaticism, the conviction of being the custodians of God’s word, compensates the people for their sacrifices and persuades them to accept their economic and cultural poverty: they have nothing but feel privileged for their relationship with God.

For this mentality to change, a cultural battle is necessary, one that combats the ignorance prevalent especially in the most remote and isolated areas and makes people aware of their dignity and rights against an apparently inevitable slavery.

This is what Rawa activists do, working for years mainly with women, who are the most oppressed by patriarchal ideology, resisting every day in the hope of creating popular consensus capable of rebelling against the Taliban and overthrowing them.

Just as democracy cannot be exported—as the US and allies pretended to do with the invasion of Afghanistan that ended with the Taliban’s return—because only the people can conquer it enduringly by acting in person, now it is only the people who can decide to end this oppressive regime.

We must support democratic forces within the country. International support should go to them, to women, to groups and organizations working there to create a culture and resistance that deeply contrasts the Taliban ideology. This support should not only be in political actions directly aimed at this but, first and foremost, with concrete aid to the population to meet the primary needs made urgent by the humanitarian crisis. As long as humanitarian support does not go through the Taliban’s hands, who would divert it for other purposes, but through independent channels.